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COPYRIGHTING THE NEW MUSIC*
PAUL GOLDSTEiN*'
A new and developing emphasis in the arts is upon the initial creative act.
The historic concern for the appearance and quality of the final work is
being displaced by a modern regard for the threshold spontaneity of the artis-
tic endeavor.1 Thus in "action art," typified by the splatterings of Pollack and
de Kooning, and in modern jazz, stress is upon the instinctive, the generative
quality of the art.
2
This altered emphasis is reflected in the vacation of form and consistency
from the final work; the traditional attempt to communicate with an audience
through a common and ordered language has in some areas given way to a sin-
gle concern for the artist's inchoate impulse.
THE NEw Music iN CONTEXT
This incipient trend is clearly evident in the new music. Its composers
look upon traditional harmonic structure as a "recent occidental phenomenon,
for the past century in a process of disintegration." 3 And although the new
music can be viewed as one phase in a development initiated by Stravinsky,
Schoenberg, Ives and Varese,4 it typically lacks in the sense of order which char-
acterizes the work of these predecessors. Absent a notated basis, its composition
is dependent upon the artist's improvisatory technique in dealing with random
sounds.5
* This article was awarded the National First Prize in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition for the best paper on copyright law submitted by contestants throughout the
United States. It is published through the courtesy of the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers.
** Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of
Law.
1. The new creative process has been distinguished from the old as "analytic" rather
than "synthetic" in character. Salzman, The New American Music, in The New American
Arts 241 (P. Kostelanetz ed. 1965). Under the modem personal emphasis, "whoever under-
takes to create soon finds himself engaged in creating himself." H, Rosenberg, The Tradi-
tion of the New 10 (1959).
Attempts at dealing with the legal context of the new arts are scattered. Copyright im-
plications in the analogous field of electronic music are throughly explored in Savelson,
Electronic Music and the Copyright Law, ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium Number Thir-
teen 133 (1964). See also Meagher, Copyright Problems Presented by a New Art, 30 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1081 (1955) (Protective problems posed by the new medium of videotape.);
Comment, 10 Wayne L. Rev. 702 (1964) (Difficulties in copyrighting the newly popular
folk music.).
2. Aside from the new music, other forms characterized by this new emphasis are
electronic music, movies of the nouvelle vogue and lately of the "underground," and the
theatre of the absurd. The most recent and catholic development is "happenings" which
often embrace all these other forms in their composition and in which the stress is totally
upon the spontaneous or, at least, upon the appearance of spontaneity. See Village Voice,
June 2, 1966, at 6, col. 2.
3. J. Cage, Silence 63 (1961).
4. Id. 70-73.
5. If notation is used, rarely is it conventional, The Score for Earle Brown's "4 Sys-
tems" is a drawing of rectangles of varying lengths and widths. In order to multiply the
number of possible variations, the composer gives permission to the conductor "to read the
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John Cage, the new music's chief theorist, suggests that its progress
must necessarily be carried on by hitting anything-tin pans, rice
bowls, iron pipes-everything we can lay our hands on. Not only hit-
ting, but rubbing, smashing, making sound in every possible way.0
Thus in Robert Ashley's "Wolfman," the composer stood at center stage
and shouted at the top of his voice into a microphone for almost eighteen min-
utes. One observer noted that it was "difficult to hear him, however, because
his electronic accompaniment of piercing shrieks and whistles was played at
peak volume and in the din his voice was often obliterated. ' 7
In practice the new music may consist of more than sounds. Although
one festival dedicated to music of the avant garde" opened with "a droning
sound issuing from two loudspeakers on either side of the stage," it subsequently
witnessed a "Robot Opera" in which a creaking but "attractive mechanical
monster shambled on stage with the gait of a Frankenstein creation."0
At its most typical, the music is inclined to use of theatrical effects. 10 In
Alvin Lucier's "Composition for Pianist and Mother," an elderly lady comes on
stage and seats herself to the right of the piano. The pianist enters, takes off
his shoes, runs around the piano in his stocking feet and caresses the piano. The
mother blows her nose loudly and the pianist lifts the piano lid and plucks a
string. The mother then comes to the piano and blows the pianist's nose on a
large napkin. While he knocks on the inside of the piano the mother claps very
quietly.'1
SHOULD COPYRIGHT EXTEND TO THE NEW Music?
The questions posed by this article are whether, and how, the law is to ac-
cord copyright protection to the new music. The answer to the first question
encounters no difficulty in the fundamental role of Congress. When extending
statutory protection to intellectual properties, its posture is not that of guardian
of the old order; rather the constitutional mandate to Congress is clear that it
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'12
Any difficulty lies in the nature of the art itself. In most instances copyright
vests in the completed work of art, and it is a nice question whether this attitude
of the law is premised upon the traditional cultural concern with the final work.13
cardboard in any of four positions: right side up, upside down, sideways, up and down." Or
the composer may divide all pitches into high, middle and low and merely indicate to the
musicians how many in a given range are to be played, thus leaving to them the real task
of composition. J. Cage, supra note 3, at 13, 37. See also Salzman, supra note 1, at 248-49.
6. Id. at 87.
7. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1964, at 29, col. 2.
8. Works of the new music have been primarily aired in the New York Festival of the
Avant Garde which has taken place annually since 1963 at Judson Hall in New York City.
9. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1965, at 20, col. 1.
10. J. Cage, supra note 3, at 12.
11. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1964, at 18, col. 2.
12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (Emphasis added.).
13. An affirmative answer is suggested by the extensive judicial hair-splitting engen-
dered by the phrase in U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 "securing.. .the exclusive Right to.. .Writ-
ings...." (Emphasis added.). See infra notes 53-59. The requirement that a work qualify
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That is, should legal protection be withheld when the aesthetic emphasis is not
upon the work as an end in itself, when the work is secondary, a mere evidence
of the artist's creative grappling?
Two answers are suggested. Regardless of its cathartic origin, the work
produced stands as something created, generically indistinguishable from tra-
dftional art. A composition like Stravinsky's Le Sacre du Printemps, the product
of a labored attempt at creating an image of disorder pervaded by an under-
lying sense of unity, is for legal purposes no different from a new music work in
which the chaos is natural and the presence of any unifying scheme accidental.
Secondly, the motive behind copyright law is economic; thus based, it
ought to extend protection to the artist who has expended his time and energies
in a new and questionable pursuit as well as to the one who has labored, though
perhaps more considerably, in the old tradition. The law should not discriminate
and forbid a pirate to copy a traditional, copyrighted work yet allow him to
reproduce and perform, to his own profit, a work of new music.
There remains the question whether the new artist will actually desire
copyright protection. As his emphasis is upon the creative act, it might be urged
that the artist does not highly regard the final work-at least does not regard it
sufficiently to seek protection of rights in it. A more practical answer would de-
pend, in large measure, upon the degree of public acceptance his art has attained.
A de Kooning or a Pollack painting will today bring a high price on the market.
As the new music gains a wider audience, its creator may equally value sharing
in the fund that reproductions of his work may bring.14
THRESHOLD QUESTIONS OF COPYRIGHT
The remainder of this study will deal with various aspects of the second
question raised: how to secure copyright protection for the new music. The
technical problems engendered by this art are no less difficult of resolution than
those posed by its fundamental aesthetics.
As indicated by the description of the new music above, its approaches
and content are varied. It is amenable, however, to at least four generalizations.
It is usually spontaneous in origin because of the absence of a notated score. It is
catholic in its embrace, including not only musical and non-musical sounds,
but theatrics, monologues, pantomime and choreography as well.
A new music piece may involve one or one hundred performers, and in
some of its more ambitious works the entire audience is engaged in the composi-
as a writing lends credence to the view that this traditional cultural emphasis on the final
work-a writing-underlies American copyright law. By way of contrast, the French doc-
trine of droit moral recognizes "certain rights clearly attached to the personality and reputa-
tion of the creator [which] remain with him despite a complete and total alienation of his
work .... " Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
privileged Artist under the Copyright Law, ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium Number
Eleven 1, 13 (1962).
14. The extent to which new music composers have already sought recompense through
recordings of their works is indicated by the "Selected Discography," a six page bibliography
of recordings in Salzman, supra note 1, at 265-70.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion.15 It is intractable; its infinitely varied emission of sounds, and the equally
varied antics of its participants, render it difficult of any notation subsequent to
performance.
This last characteristic intractability-poses the chief problem involved
in copyrighting the new music: how to render it in some fixed form so that, as
a writing, it will be registrable. Yet its other aspects give rise to at least three
legal considerations ancillary to registration which should be discussed at the
outset: (1) Does the spontaneous, and often haphazard, composition meet the
minimum standard of originality required for coypright? (2) If there are any
rights in the work, in whom do they vest-in the conductor-composer, or in the
individual musicians who are sometimes independently responsible for the cre-
ation? (3) As composition is frequently simultaneous with performance, will
performance constitute an abandonment of the work to the public domain?
And, if not, will manufacture and sale of sound recordings of the uncopyrighted
composition work a forfeiture?
A, Sufficiency of Artistic Merit
Only a minority of courts today equate a novel use of melody, rhythm or
harmony with the originality requisite for copyright in a musical work, 1 or
insist that the composition represent more than mechanical skill to be copy-
rightable.1 7 The more modem and predominant view is that lack of melody and
musical merit is of no consequence.' 8 The courts appear hesitant to act as cen-
sors of the arts and will generally hold a musical piece copyrightable absent an
actual copying of another work.'0
The majority view is incorporated in the proposed revision of the copy-
right law. 1y specifying the subject matter of copyright as simply "original
works of authorship"-20 the intention of the revisors is to "maintain the estab-
15. In George Brecht's "Exhibit 27" a long rope is passed through the audience; its
becoming intertwined in it and the private tugs of war that follow are considered to be part
of the composition. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1964, at 18, col. 2.
16. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp, 393, 400 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952); cf. Smith v. George E, Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729, 731-32
(W.D. Mo. 1956). See also Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright 39 B.U.L. Rev
526, 540 (1959).
17. Smith v. George E, Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729, 731 (W.D. Mo.
1956); cf. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (dictum). See
also Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627 (1883).
18. Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956); Alfred Bell. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Chard Co.,
134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). Sec
also Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright, 39 B.U.L. Rev. 526, 541 (1959).
19. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903); Dorsey
v. Old Sur. Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938); Jeweler's Circular Publ. Co. v.
Keystone Pub]. Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922). But cf. Jackson v. Quickslip Co., 27 F.
Supp. 388 (E.D .. Y. 1939); Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415 (D.C. Mass.
1936). See also Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright, 39 B.U.L, Rev. 526, 531
(1959).
20. Register of Copyrightsi 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part Six 3
(Comm. Print 1965).
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lished standards of originality without implying any further requirements of
aesthetic value, novelty, or ingenuity."2 1
B. The Question of Authorship
Assuming then that there are protectible rights in the work, the question
arises, in whom do they vest? If the function of each performer in non-scored
pieces is to create something "out of a store of raw materials 2 2 it would ap-
pear that he is the independent creator of his own musical sounds and so entitled
to copyright therein. Two considerations are thus germane: whether the com-
plete composition is to be viewed as a separable aggregate of single works, en-
titling each author to copyrightas or whether it is to be considered a musical
unit rendering them joint owners 2 4 Second is the problem of whether they are
authors at all, i.e., whether the composer-conductor is properly the sole author.
Despite the discordance of the new music and the frequent impression that
the performers are mutually antagonistic, judicial precedent would tend to char-
acterize their individual efforts as combining to form a joint work, The English
requirement that the joint work evidence a "common design" 28 is no longer fol-
lowed in this country. American courts have established instead varied criteria
determinative of the joint work, including evidence of a "fusion of effort," o
"unity of presentation, 2 7 association "as a unit in the public mind,"28 and in-
tent20 or knowledge8 ° that others will combine their work with the work being
created "to result in a single composition."31 Thus where a composer wrote a
score to which lyrics were later added by writers unknown to him, the combina-
tion was held to be a joint work.32
In terms of these criteria, the factor decisive of a joint work is the individ-
ual author's proximity to the completed composition regardless of the indepen-
21. Id.
22. J. Cage, supra note 3, at 38.
23. A composite work is one which assembles the separate works of different
authors. Right to co-ownership do not arise out of such works because of "the absence of any
intent to create a unitary product." Comment, 8 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 1035, 1036 (1961). See
generally G. Cary, joint Ownership of Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision Study No, 12,
Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the House Comm.
on the judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960); Register of Copyrights, supra
note 20, at 68.
24. The joint work is a "unitary work, the parts of which, nlthough created by several
authors, are not considered to be individual works in themselves." G. Cary, supra note 23,
at 87. For the revision view see Register of Copyrights, supra note 20, at 65.
25, Levy v. Rutley, L,R. 6. C.P. 523, 529 (1871).
26. G. Cary, supra note 23, at 92; cf. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 161 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1946).
27. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
But cf. Herbert v. Fields, 152 N.Y. Supp. 487, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
28. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42, F. Supp, 859, 864
(S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
29. Comment, supra note 23, at 1037.
30. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.
N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944; G. Cary, supra note, 23, at 91.
31. Comment, supra note 23 at 1037,
32. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.
N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
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dence or uniqueness of his effort. It may be noted here that judicial determination
that a composition is a joint work gives rise to a constellation of rights and
liabilities among the individual creators inter se. 38
There remains the more difficult question of the performers' rights vis-h-vis
the composer-conductor. The status of these rights may be easily settled in a
contract between the performers and the composer who has brought them into
concert, "authorship" vesting solely in the latter. Such contracts are used widely
in the motion picture industry,3 4 and rest upon the statutory provision that "the
word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire."3 8
Absent a contractual determination of authorship, resolution of the prob-
lem will depend in each case upon the role played by the composer. If he takes
an active part in the performance and is the effective cause of the final compo-
sition, rights will probably vest in him.3 6 Presence of a written score created
by him will be further evidence of his central position in the work. Thus the
closer the composer comes to the bounds of conventional composition, the more
responsibility he takes for the final product, the greater is his chance of being
adjudged the sole author of the work. For purposes of convenience in the dis-
cussion that follows, it will be assumed that rights in the work are in the com-
poser. Were the performers the owners, like considerations would, in any event,
apply.
C. Divestitive Publication: After Performance
Because of the spontaneous nature of the new music, such rights as have
been discussed must, of necessity, remain abstract until the actual performance
of the piece. There is not, as in conventional composition, an intermediate
stage-setting a completed score down on paper-at which the composer's rights
vest. While the traditional composer can consolidate his rights by copyrighting
the score, the creator of a work of new music must await performance before
any rights come into being.
At least one writer has urged that public performance of an uncopyrighted
musical composition should constitute its dedication to the public and conse-
quently work a forfeiture of the common law copyright in the composition.8 7
If such a view were to prevail, the composer of new music would be placed in the
unique position of having created a work only to observe the instantaneous dis-
appearance of all his rights in it.
Courts in this country have, however, uniformly adopted the rule that
33. For an extensive discussion of the rights and liabilities arising from the joint owner-
ship situation, see Comment, supra note 23, at 1035.
34. G. Cary, supra note 23, at 88; Zissu, The Copyright Dilemma of the Screen Com-
poser, 1 Hollywood Q. 317 (April 1946).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
36. The author is "the person who effectively is as near as he can be, the cause of the
picture which is produced, that is, the person who has superintended the arrangement ... by
putting the persons in position .... " Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627 (1883), cited with
approval in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884).
37. Selvin, Should Performance Dedicate?, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1954).
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public performance of an uncopyrighted work does not result in its abandon-
ment to the public domain.3 8 This doctrine has been followed in a case involving
public choral performances of a composition3 9 and is applied regardless of
whether the performance is for profit. 40 Ostensibly the rule rests upon the prem-
ise that performance of a work at a concert hall is not a "copy" of the work.41
D. Divestitive Publication: After Recording
Despite the fact that his rights will be protected after public performance,
the composer is placed, by the nature of his art, at a subsequent disadvantage.
If aesthetic dogma precludes him from notating the composition before per-
formance, so does the often non-musical quality of the work make it difficult
to transcribe a score in traditional form during performance. In order to pre-
serve his rights he must, of course, in some manner preserve the composition.
The most obvious and economical means would be through a sound recording
of the performance.
The absence of statutory copyright for sound recordings will be discussed
below. To be dealt with at this point is the problem facing the composer who
seeks to benefit financially by manufacturing and selling sound recordings of
the performance and at the same time retain his common law copyright in it.
Until 1950 such a course would have been safely open to him. Before the
decision in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 42 in that year, it
was generally believed that the manufacture and sale of phonograph records of
a performance of a work did not divest the composer of his common law copy-
right in the underlying composition.43 Judge Igoe's statement that "production
and sale of a phonograph record is fully as much publication as production and
sale of sheet music,"'44 though clearly dictum, has been found persuasive in sub-
sequent cases.45
The Miracle rule, as later construed, is perhaps not so harsh as would first
38. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); Jerome v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340(E.DN.C. 1939) (dictum); Metropolitan Opera Assoc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (1st Dep't 1951); Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph
Records, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 469, 484 (1955) ; Nimmer, Copyright Pitblication, 56 Colurm. L.
Rev. 185 (1956).
39. Mills Music, Inc., v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
40. Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); McCarthy & Fischer,
Inc. v. White, 259 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
41. A. M. Shafter, Musical Copyright 130-131 (2d ed. 1939).
42. 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
43. Yacoubian v. Carroll, 74 U.S.P.Q. 257 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Waring v. VATDAS Broad-
casting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937). But cf. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q.
137 (Cal. 1949).
44. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill.
1950).
45. McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 682-83 (S.D. Cal. 1958)(dictum); Mills Music Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)(dictum); Biltmore Music Corp. v. Kittinger, 29 Copy. Dec. 32 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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appear. The courts that have followed it have generally given it credence only to
the extent it requires a divestitive publication of the recorded performance and
not of the underlying composition. Aside from Miracle, only one case has dicta to
the effect that the manufacture and sale of records works a dedication of the com-
position to the public.46 The other cases often cited as following the Miracle
rule 47 apply on their facts not to compositions but rather to arrangements of an
already copyrighted work4" or orchestral renditions of it.49 In the latter case,
Judge Learned Hand was careful to distinguish between abandonment of rights
in the composition and in the performance. 0
Although this distinction would represent an aspect of security for the
composer of conventional music who has not copyrighted his score, it raises
difficult questions with regard to the new music. Performance of the new music
is by nature inextricable from its composition. Indeed, analytically it is ques-
tionable whether such a work is anything more than a performance. Thus a court,
in conceding that divestiture goes to the recorded performance alone, may well
leave the composer with nothing, there being no evidence of a subsisting composi-
tion. Again, the closer he approaches musical convention by creating the minimum
of a written score, the more secure will be the composer's rights.
This is not to say that the courts are uniform in viewing the manufacture
and sale of records as constituting a divestitive publication of even the perfor-
mance contained therein. At least three cases have held that placing recordings
of a performance on sale does not dedicate the right to copy the record. 1 These
decisions rest on the rationale that as a recording is no more than a captured
performance of the composition, the sale of records should not be treated
otherwise than as public performance.52 The assumption that underlies this line
of decisions-that there are protectable rights in a performance--will be explored
below with regard to unfair competition.
STATUTORY COPYRIGHT I.
THE PossIBILITY OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE PRESENT STATUTE
That the composer is precluded from preserving and statutorily protecting
his work by making a sound recording of it was settled in 1908 when the Supreme
Court held that a perforated music roll is not a "copy" of the musical composi-
46. Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Nimmer, supra note 38, at 192.
47. For a somewhat different view of this distinction, see Nimmer, supra note 38, at
191.
48. McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 682-83 (S.D, Cal. 1958);
Biltmore Music Corp. v. Kittinger, 29 Copy. Dec. 32 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
49. RCA Mfg. Co. v, Whiteman, 144 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir, 1940), cert denied, 311
U.S. 712 (194b); cf. Yacoubian v. Carroll, 74 U.S.P.Q. 257 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
50. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 144 F.2d at 88.
51. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955);
Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937); cf. Corcoran v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cif. 1941). See generally Kaplan, supra note 38.
52. Kaplan, supra note 38, at 480. But cf. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 195-96.
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tion recorded on it.s It is generally agreed in this country that a phonograph
recording is similarly not a "visible expression of the "ideas in the mind of the
author,"54 and hence is not registrable under the copyright law,55 Although a
liberal reading of section five of the present Act56 might view recordings as
registrable apart from the thirteen specifications of copyrightable works, neither
the courts57 nor the Copyright Office5 8 have been disposed to such an interpre-
tation. The courts have chosen not to follow the concurring opinion in White-
Smith Publishing Co. v. Appollo Co., where Justice Holmes wrote,
On principle anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation of
sounds ought to be held a copy, or if the statute is too narrow ought to
be made so by a further act .... 59
The White-Smith decision is critical for the new music composer. The most
economical way for him to preserve his non-notated work is by making a sound
recording of it. The status of his common law copyright once a recording has
been manufactured and sold has been rendered questionable by the Miracle
rule. And, as under White-Smith statutory copyright is not available for sound
recordings, he must look to other devices which will secure statutory rights for
his non-notated work.
A. Copyrighting a Transcript
Against the legal problems engendered by the lack of a formative base in
the new music is the compensating aspect of its catholicity, its ability to embrace
other forms of art in its composition. Paradoxically it is this most modern charac-
teristic that affords the new music its greatest chance for statutory copyright.
If the composition incorporates other forms-for example, pantomime, mono-
logue and dance-it may be amenable to registration in one of the other recog-
nized art categories.
One tactic, then, would be to have someone transcribe the composition as
53. White-Smith Publ. Co. v. Appollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908).
54. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). Donoghue v.
Allied Newspapers, Ltd., [1938] 1 Ch. 106, expresses the English view that "writing" is not
limited to the physical act of putting something on paper. For a discussion of this problem
as found in a modern context, see Meagher, Copyright Problems Presented by a New Art, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1081, 1085 (1955).
55. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1959) provides: "A phonograph record or other sound record-
ing is not considered a 'copy' of the compositions recorded on it, and is not acceptable for
copyright registration."
56. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1964) provides: "The above specifications shall not be held to
limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4 of this title...."
57. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955);
W. Derenberg, The Meaning of "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
Copyright Law Revision Study No. 3, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the House Comm. on the judiciary 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (Comm, Print
1960).
58. Regulations of the Copyright Office, 21 Fed. Reg. 6021 (1956). See also, H. R. Rep.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909): "Section 4 [presently 5] is declaratory of existing
law and use of the term 'writings' in it was not intended to alter the construction the courts
had given it."
59. White-Smith Publ. Co. v. Appoilo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1908).
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it is performed, describing the action in scenario form, noting musical passages
as they appear. The resulting conglomerate might well shock the Register of
Copyrights, but as it is merely an admixture of traditional notations there is no
reason why it cannot be accepted for registration as a dramatico-musical com-
position60 or as a simple musical composition."' If there is a question as to which
it is, it may be registered alternatively as one or the other 2 and, in any case,
there is no penalty for erroneous classification. 3
In this regard the creator of the new music stands in a better position than
the composer of the more widely accepted electronic music whose work is de-
void of dramatic trappings, is "indifferent in motive, originating in no psychology
nor in dramatic intentions, nor literary or pictorial purposes." 4
B. Copyrighting a Motion Picture
The task of transcribing a new music concert on paper is a difficult one,
accounting as it must not only for a wide range of actions but for a cacophony
of sounds as well. An easier, though more costly, alternative would be in making
a sound-synchronized film of the performance, registering it as a motion picture
photoplay 5 or as a motion picture other than a photoplay.00 The technique of
filming a work and registering it under sections 5(1) or 5(m) is relevant to
the other developing arts as well and therefore will be discussed below in some
detail.67
The addition of motion picture classifications to the Copyright Act by the
Townsend Amendment of 191268 represents the last congressional extension of
the statute. Under the terms of the Act, exhibition of copyrighted films of a new
music performance without the copyright owner's consent would appear to con-
stitute infringement of the owner's rights in the sound track as well as in the film
in its purely visual aspect.0 9
The spontaneous quality of the musical composition should pose no barrier
to registration if it is filmed, as it is accepted doctrine that the courts will not
60. 17 U.S.C. § 5(d) (1964).
61. Id. § 5(e).
62. This was a technique employed and approved of by the Supreme Court in
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1964).
64. Christian Wolff, quoted in J. Cage, Silence 68 (1961).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 5(1) (1964); 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(a) (1959); "This class includes
published or unpublished motion pictures that are dramatic in character and tell a connected
story, such as feature films, filmed television plays, short subjects and animated cartoons
having a plot."
66. 17 U.S.C. § 5(m) (1964); 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(b) (1959): "This class includes
published or unpublished nondramatic films such as newsreels, travelogs, training or promo-
tional films, nature studies, and filmed television programs having no plot."
67. At least one motion picture has been deposited with the Register as the fixed form
of a choreographic work. B. Varmer, Copyright in Choreographic Works, Copyright Law
Revision Study No. 28, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (Comm. Print 1961).
68. Act of Aug. 24, 1919, c. 356, 37 Stat. 488; W. Derenberg, supra note 57, at 76.
69. See Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Michael M. Wyngate, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 82
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Famous Music Corp. v. Melz, 28 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. La. 1939).
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inquire into the artistic structure of a work to determine its copyrightability. 0 It
appears to be a minority view that for a motion picture to be copyrightable it
must have some dramatic basis.7 ' The prevailing rule is that since the motion
picture film is itself a "writing" 72 there need be no requirement of an underlying
plot.7 3
The composer's chief concern is with the protection of his musical com-
position and not the ancillary postures of his performers. Although the situation
of the traditional film maker is the converse of this, it would seem that if he is
protected in the background music to his film, so ought the composer be protected
where the music is the raison d'gtre of the film. The question, then, is simply
whether the exclusive rights that attach to the visual portion of the film adhere
to the sound track as well. The status of motion picture sound tracks under the
present law has been characterized as "a very difficult and special problem"
since at the time "motion pictures were added to the list of copyrightable works
in 1912 the talking picture, with integrated sound track, had not yet been in-
vented."7
4
The silence of Congress on the subject might be presumed to indicate its
acceptance of the view that the rights accorded motion pictures in 1912 extend
also to synchronized sound tracks. At least one case has accepted this'extension
by implication, 75 and one by dictum76 and two others have held that copyright in
a motion picture protects an original story sequence therein.71 These last two
decisions analogously apply to the situation where the sound track occupies as
vital a position in the film as the story line.
Another case78 held that the words, "exclusive moving picture rights" em-
ployed in a licensing contract made when "talkies" were not yet a popular genre,
were sufficient to embrace not only motion pictures of the sort then
known but also such technical improvements in motion pictures as
might be developed during the term of the license, namely the term of
the copyright.79
It would of course be difficult to apply a case in contract squarely to the is-
70. See supra p. 358, and supra note 19.
71. Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F. Supp. 526 (D.C. Mass. 1939).
72. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 3 F. Supp. 66 (D.
Mass. 1933).
73. Patterson v. Century Product., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937) (by implication);
Tiffany Product., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931); cf. Pathe Exchange, Inc. v.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 3 F. Supp. 63 (D.C.N.Y. 1932).
74. Ringer, Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, Staff of Senate Comm. on
the judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d Sess., Studies Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights 4, 8 (Comm. Print 1961).
75. Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137, 142 (Cal. 1949).
76. Jerome v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), aff'd, 169 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948).
77. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd,
356 U.S. 43 (1958); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1947).
78. L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936).
79. Id. at 199.
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sue of legislative intent when the question of protection in sound tracks is before
the courts. Yet the reasoning involved is analogous and has been accepted by at
least one court.80 With the lack of controlling precedent other courts might be
persuaded by language to the effect that "the development of a mechanism
making it possible to accompany the screen picture with the sound of spoken
words was but an improvement in the motion picture art .... ,,1
Under the present decisions, then, the position of the composer-film pro-
ducer would appear tenable with respect to his vital interest in the sound track.
Passage of the proposed revision bill would render his position even more secure.
The bill regards the video and aural portions of the film as inextricable, 82 and
defines "motion pictures" as specifically including synchronized sound tracks.83
With apparently secure rights in the sound track under the present law,
and clear rights under the proposed revision, the composer who resorts to filming
his work will find himself in a position of advantage with respect to the conven-
tional composer. While profits for the traditional composer usually lie in the sale
of recordings of his work, these profits are limited by the statute's compulsory
licensing provision which is effective subsequent to the first recording.84
As the film with appended sound track is not considered to be a mechanical
recording, 5 the new music composer may profit from its exclusive use although
"the extent of copyright protection for a sound track when used separately as a
purely aural work is a . . . doubtful question." 6
In any case, it would appear that the composer could make a phono-record-
ing from the copyrighted film for manufacture and sale although in this course
he will necessarily be limited by the mechanical licensing provision. Employing
this tactic, he would be in much the same position as his conventional colleague,
the difference being only in the nature of the underlying copyrighted "writing"
of the composition.
The device of obtaining copyright in a sound-synchronized motion picture
is of use not only to the composer of new music but also to artists engaged in
other areas. At least one film has been deposited with the Register as the fixed
form of a choreographic work.87 Jazz improvisionists could avail themselves of
filming to preserve the rights in their fugitive compositions. Even the composer
of electronic music might find a secure niche in the motion picture classification
by filming a tape recorder playing his work.
80. Jerome v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. 67 F. Supp. 736 (S.D,N.Y, 1946),
aff'd, 165 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948).
81. L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d at 199.
82. Register of Copyrights, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part Six 22
(Comm. Print 1965).
83. Id. at 5.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
85. Jerome v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1946); Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952) (by implica-
tion); cf. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957); Comment, 26
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 745 (1958), Comment, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 621 (1958).
86. Ringer, supra note 74, at 8.
87. B. Varmer, supra note 67, at 96.
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The extent to which courts will sustain this sham is questionable. Yet, in
order to overturn it they will have to face a profound issue of policy: how far
may a judge go in determining what is the proper subject of a motion picture?
The question clearly borders on the settled rule that the courts will not inquire
into the artistic merit of a work in order to determine its copyrightability.88 If
any distinction is to be made it must be on the ground of the creator's purpose-
whether it was primarily to create a video film with audio portions only secon-
dary, or vice-versa. Such a distinction would be difficult of proof, and there is a
serious policy question of whether it ought to be attempted at all.
STATUTORY COPYRIGHT II.
REGISTRATION OF A SOUND RECORDING UNDER THE PROPOSED REVISION
The proposed revision of the copyright law advances the current position
by according statutory copyright to sound recordings.8 9 If passed, it would
bring American law into line with the law of England9" and most other foreign
jurisdictions.91 Yet the sound recording provision of the bill deals only imper-
fectly with the difficulties of protection posed by the new music. It finesses cer-
tain problems but leaves other, more troublesome ones, untouched.
The bill would provide for the registration of sound recordings in a sepa-
rate category and afford the copyright owner the right "to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords that directly or indirectly recapture the
actual sounds fixed in the recording." 92 The revision approach would distin-
guish the sound recording, as a copyrightable work,
from any musical, literary or dramatic works that are reproduced on
"phonorecords." Thus a phonorecord (a disk or tape, for example) of a
popular song would usually constitute a reproduction of two copy-
righted works under the bill: the song and the sound recording of it.93
In this sense the revision bill embodies the legacy of the Capitol Records-
Gieseking line of decisions discussed above,94 which recognizes a distinction
between the underlying composition and the performer's contribution to it of
'novel intellectual or artistic value."9 5 The prominent trend is clearly directed to
88. See supra p. 358, and supra note 19.
89. Register of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 51.
90. 1 & 2 Geo. V c. 46, § 19(1) (1911).
91. See 1 S. Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property§§ 97, 98 (1938).
92. Register of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 51. As early as 1908 Nathan Burkan argued
for this sort of statutory provision. For an extract from Mr. Burkan's argument see
Diamond, Memorandum Submitted in Behalf of Decca Records, Inc. in Connection with
Proposed Copyright Legislation (1949) (unpublished paper on file in Columbia Law School
Library). Later scholars were also impressed with the need for reform. See Chafee,
Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 719, 734-37 (1945); Derenberg,
supra note 57, at 102.
93. Register of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 49.
94. See supra p. 362, and supra note 51.
95. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 441, 194 A. 631, 639
(1937).
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protection of "the performer's rendition or arrangement, or the record com-
pany's interpretation, or both and not the music itself."96
Thus the proposed revision avoids the problem posed by the new music:
how to protect the underlying composition when it is not reduced to fixed nota-
tion? Under the bill the composer would be protected from unauthorized dupli-
cation of his recording but query whether this is a sufficient shelter inasmuch
as the underlying composition might be copied freely.
What has been said above97 with regard to the inextricability of performance
from composition in the new music is equally applicable here. Although a work of
the new music may be conceptually viewed as totally a performance with no un-
derlying composition, the protection of recorded performances under the proposed
bill is not a complete protection for the composer. A pirate could imitate every
sound of the composer's record and yet remain without the sanctions of the bill.
All that he is prevented from doing is copying, dubbing the record itself. The
revision is in this respect clearly addressed to protection of the unique sounds
produced by the orchestra or performer; the underlying basis of the sounds-the
score-is not within its scope. So, although this underlying basis will in the case
of the new music be created by the performer himself, copyright in the recording
will attach only to the unique rendition.
This distinction between performance and composition is in the case of the
new and electronic music logically impossible to make. Yet by looking at the
problem from the remedial side, as one of whom protection is afforded against,
and not as one of the nature of the subject protected under the bill, logic is
clear that all that is protected against is the infringer who dubs the recording.
The impediment thus posed to the composer's rights is all the more serious
as the revision is also explicit in denying an exclusive right of public performance
in sound recordings.98 The explanation given is that recognition of such a right
"would make the general revision bill so controversial that the chances of its
passage would be seriously impaired." 99
RIGHTS OUTSIDE THE STATUTE: THE DOCTRINE OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
Equity initiated the doctrine of unfair competition 00 which, in its modern
sense, will require the injunction of any "effort to profit from the labor, skill,
96. W. Derenberg, supra note 57, at 78.
97. See supra p. 355.
98. One writer has made the suggestion that, under the proposed revision, sound
recordings, copyrighted by the statutory author, which are not copyrighted by the author
in another category should have exclusive performance rights and whatever other rights are
given to authors who register their works in other categories. Savelson, Electronic Mlusic
and the Copyright Law, ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium Number Thirteen 133, 163
(1964).
99. Register of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 51.
100. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See
generally Feldman, The Relationship Between Copyright and Unfair Competition Principles,
ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium Number Ten 266 (1959); Handier, Unfair Competition,
21 Iowa L. Rev. 175 (1936); Comment, 33 So. Calif. L. Rev. 190 (1960).
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expenditures, name and reputation of others. ... " 0 1 Through this doctrine the
courts, in exercising a "pragmatic spirit," 10 2 seek to fill the interstices occasioned
by the application of an outdated copyright law in a culturally and economically
expanding society.10
3
Characteristics of the new music that would be sources of difficulty under
a statutory application are uniquely accommodated by the unfair competition
doctrine. One problematical aspect is the music's spontaneous quality, its aggre-
gation of individual performances independent of any underlying score. There
is also the difficulty posed by the fundamental nature of the new music: its em-
phasis upon the initial creative act rather than upon the final work.
A. Unfair Competition and the Spontaneous Performance
Composition of a spontaneously created new music work is conceptually
inextricable from its performance. This quality was discussed above with regard
to its divestitive result under the rule of Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle
Record Co.'0 4 To be noted here is the converse legal status effected by unfair
competition. The doctrine accords rights in a performance and, if a new music
work is regarded as solely a "performance," will recognize in it an intellectual
property at the time of its creation.
In Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc. 0 5 it was held that the
owner and conductor of an orchestra had a recognizable property right in his
orchestra's unique rendition of copyrighted works, and the court enjoined a0
radio station from broadcasting recordings of the performance. 10 6 Similarly,
courts have recognized the property right of a pianist in his performance,107 of
101. Metropolitan Opera Assoc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't
1951). Accord, National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir.
1902); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937);
Lehrenkrauss v. Universal Tours, 262 N.Y. 332, 186 N.E. 802 (1933); Fisher v. Star Co.,
231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures
Co., 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938). But see Cheney Bros. v. Doris
Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930) ; see also Handler,
supra note 100, at 190-91.
102. Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 480
(1951).
103. See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937):
"[T]hese latter day inventions make demands upon the creative and ever-evolving energy
of equity to extend that protection so as adequately to do justice under current conditions
of life." Id. at 435, 194 A. at 632.
104. 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950). See supra p. 361.
105. 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
106. Accord, RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman et al. 114, F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940) (dictum); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D.N.C. 1939)
(dictum); Fontiopia, Ltd. et. al v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (C.D.E.D.N.Y. 1909). But cf. G.
Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952); Miller v. Universal Pictures
Co., 11 A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 248,
224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961); Glory Records, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 213 N.Y.S.2d 875
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Comment, 25 Albany L. Rev. 167 (1961).
107. Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
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an opera company in its productions, 08 and of a jazz artist in his improvisa-
tions.-0 9
In light of its protective concern for performance, for the doctrine of -un-
fair competition to apply to a new music work it will be necessary for the courts
to view the composition as solely an aggregate of performances with rights
vesting in the conductor-composer."10 The absence of a written score will thus
be to the benefit of the composer as it renders the work more a performance
than a traditional composition.' In this it may be seen that the considerations
which apply in the area of unfair competition are different from those applicable
to the question of divestitive publication by recording where the closer the
composer approached the bounds of conventional composition the more tenable
his position became. 1 2
It is not clear whether the courts will require the existence of an underlying
composition as a condition precedent to finding rights in performance of it.
There is no reason for them to do so and, indeed, traditional considerations of
equity might well extend protection to the new music composition as a unitary
whole apart from any distinctions based on performers' rights.11 3
B. Unfair Competition and Droit Moral: Protection of the Artist
The coincidence of unfair competition rules with the needs of the new music
composer is more than fortuitous; it suggests a deeper regard of the doctrine
for the initial creative act as opposed to the statutory emphasis upon the final
work. A concern for the unique aspects of performance is indicative of a con-
cern for the performer himself. In this respect, the implicit tendency of unfair
competition approaches the explicit attitude of the French doctrine of droit
moral.
108. Metropolitan Opera Assoc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
797, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st
Dep't 1951).
109. Granz v. Harris, 98 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aq'd in part and rev'd in
part, on other grounds, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
110. Cf. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
111. This was the result in a case involving recordings of jazz performances. Granz
v. Harris, 98 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, on other grounds,
198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
112. The courts' language is in this area largely rpetitive of their considerations in
another respect: whether the manufacture and sale of records constitutes a divestitive publica-
tion of the performance therein. An assumption that rights do inhere in performance would
appear essential to a conclusion that rights can be divested. Perhaps, though, the doctrine
of unfair competition represents not a step preliminary to this conclusion but, rather, the
opposite side of the Miracle rule as it has been construed in later opinions. The Miracle
position may reflect a deeper dissatisfaction with unfair competition's doctrine that rights
can exist in a performance. The dissatisfaction remains implicit, yet the courts following
Miracle achieve an equal result upon a technically supportable basis.
113. New music composers, with their taste for the macabre, might pick up a trick
or two by simply looking at the often weird situations with which equity has had to deal in
the dramatic field. See, e.g., Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (murder in the
audience); Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (vaudevillian presenting songs and
recitations while changing costume).
COPYRIGHTS
In French law the work of art is viewed as a consolidation of the personality
and thoughts of the creator.
French courts ... have built a body of law, now formally recognized
in the 1957 Copyright Act, which enunciates the rule that certain
rights clearly attached to the personality and reputation of the creator
remain with him despite a complete and total alienation of his work-
les droit vnoraux .... 114
The thrust of both doctrines-droit moral and unfair competition-is du-
al.'", On the one hand, the French doctrine would clearly parallel unfair com-
petition in locating rights in performance alone. 116 Secondly, as French law
frees the artist's "right to create" from possible incursion,11 7 so does unfair
competition forbid the infringer "to reap where it has not sown.' 1 8 The second
proposition is simply this: that every step in the artistic process-and not merely
the end product to which the statute is directed-is given legal protection under
both doctrines.
It is questionable whether discussion of the saving thrust of unfair com-
petition doctrine is today of more than academic significance. Two recent Su-
preme Court decisions, 19 in the course of dealing with patent issues, dealt
strong dicta to the effect that state court use of the doctrine to afford copyright-
like protection must be restricted.1 20
Any room for state court fashioning of interstitial remedies that has not
been foreclosed by the decisions in Sears and Compco would be completely
eliminated by passage of the copyright revision bill in its present form. Under
114. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
privileged Artist under the Copyright Law, ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium Number
Eleven 1, 13 (1962).
115. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study on the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 563, 577-78.
116. Id. at 577-78. '"[I]nsofar as the performing artist is deemed a creator, some measure
of protection to his moral right should be accorded."
117. Id. at 558.
118. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
119. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
120. Federal and state courts have reacted variously to the Sears-Compco rule. After
dismissing the decisions' broad thrust by way of footnote, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals gave effect to New York's extensive rules against misappropriation in the commercial
context. Flexitized, Inc. v. Nat'l Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965). Its pre-emptive effect has been stretched farther than
logic, and probably the Court, would demand, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. De Costa v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). One state court, while acknowledging the bar
posed by Sears and Compco to state jurisdiction in unfair competition, accorded an equal
remedy to an architect by determining that he had not published his plans and so was still
entitled to common law copyright, Edgar H. Wood Assoc., Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E. 2d 886(1964). Through this latter technique an ambitious state court could substantially circum-
vent the Sears-Compco rule by characterizing the issue of divestitive publication as a state
rather than a federal question and then radically extend the criteria determinative of
publication. See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc. 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). This
loophole was expressly left open by the Court. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964).
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the "pre-emptive clause" of the bill121 "to the extent that a right against 'unfair
competition' is merely copyright by another name, section 301 is intended to
abolish it as a common law cause of action."''1
The federal pre-emption of state equity under the bill would
be complete with respect to any work coming within the scope of the
bill .... For example, since sound recordings are now to be made copy-
rightable works, it would not be possible to afford them any rights of
public performance under State law even though they are denied these
rights under section 112 of the statute.123
On the other hand,
the pre-emptive effect of section 301 is not intended to extend to un-
fixed works such as, for example, a piece of choreography that has
never been notated or filmed... a musical composition that has been
performed from memory but never written down or recorded. These
would continue to be protected indefinitely at common law until fixed in
some form from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.1 24
If the proposed bill is passed with Section 301 intact, the implications for
the composer of new music are clear. By the very act of preserving his work,
fixing it in some reproducible form-most economically in a sound recording-he
will be forced to accept the statute as his sole source of protection. The pro-
posed revision's failure to afford him complete protection in the sound record-
ing has already been adverted to.' 25
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that a revision of American copyright law adopt one
analogue of droit moral.12 ° It would be quixotic to urge a complete embrace of
the French doctrine or, indeed, of any system so fundamentally antithetical to
121. Register of Copyrights, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part Six
95 (Comm. Print 1965).
122. Id. Courts in this country are cognizant of the doctrine of droit moral and the
terms in which they address it savor of the language of unfair competition. See e.g.,
Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948);
Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d. 770 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd
iem., 12 A.D.2d 475, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1960), motion for leave to appeal denied,
12 Af). 2d 755, 210 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1st Dep't 1961). Although Section 301 speaks literally
in terms of unfair competition alone, it is difficult to suppose that the doctrine could be
resurrected in the guise of moral right to afford protection to the composer of new music.
123. Id. at 84.
124. Id. Section 301 thus not only follows the Sears-Compco line in barring state
jurisdiction in unfair competition but, as well, would obliterate the common law copyright
handle left available by the Court. See supra note 120. By having the federal statutory
scheme attach from the moment a work is fixed in a "tangible medium of expression,"
questions of common law copyright can arise only in the marginal case. Unlike the situation
allowed for by common law copyright, hardly a colorable argument can be made that
"tangible medium of expression" poses a state rather than a federal question.
125. See supra p. 369.
126. Hauser, supra note 114. The writer would restrict alteration to the point of
coincidence with the droit de suite, a discrete economic equivalent of moral right which is
extended to creators in only the visual arts.
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the cultural emphasis-upon the work and not upon the creator-which under-
lies the American law. This single trend in the arts, and particularly in the new
music, is far too tentative to justify, of itself, such an alteration.
Yet a compromise can, and should, be effected through congressional en-
dorsement of the doctrine of unfair competition. Recognition of the doctrine's
evolutionary capacity would assure the statute of a longer life; criticisms that
may come in ten or twenty years, asserting the statute to be an anachronism,
unfit to the then existing cultural condition, could well be anticipated by allowing
room for equity to deal with the new arts on a day to day basis.
Even today, enactment of the proposed revision with section 301 intact
will create a curious paradox. The new music composer, situated at the most
advanced boundary of present culture, will find that his rights were more secure
under the old regime than under the new. In both he has equivalent access to
registration of his work as a dramatico-musical composition or motion picture.
It is under the new statute that he will necessarily be denied total recourse to the
protective influence of equity.
Pre-emption of state jurisdiction in unfair competition may add some
measure of order to a difficult and confused area. But any such benefit is clearly
outweighed by the stultifying effect such an exclusion must have upon this shel-
ter of the law which, in its traditional reflection of changing economic and social
conditions, "will not countenance a state of moral and intellectual impotency. 1127
127. Metropolitan Opera Assoc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 802,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 498 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d, 795 (1st
Dep't 1951).

